Flash Network – What are the consequences of faking an IP address in the node_announcc message?

According to BOLT 07, the Node Accountment Message looks like this:

  1. Type: 257 (node_announcement)
  2. Dates:
    • [[[[64:signature]
    • [[[[2:flen]
    • [[[[flen:properties]
    • [[[[4:time stamp]
    • [[[[33:node_id]
    • [[[[3:rgb_color]
    • [[[[32:alias]
    • [[[[2:addrlen]
    • [[[[addrlen:addresses]

the addresses have the following form:

  • The following address Description Types are defined:
    • 1: ipv4; data = [4:ipv4_addr][2:port] (Length 6)
    • 2: ipv6; data = [16:ipv6_addr][2:port] (Length 18)
    • 3: Gate v2 onion service; data = [10:onion_addr][2:port] (Length 12)
      • Onion service addresses of version 2; Encodes an 80-bit, truncated SHA-1
        Hash of a 1024-bit RSA public key for onion service (a.k.a. Tor
        hidden service).
    • 4: Gate v3 onion service; data = [35:onion_addr][2:port] (Length 37)
      • Version 3 (Prop224)
        Onion service addresses; coded:
        [32:32_byte_ed25519_pubkey] || [2:checksum] || [1:version], from where
        Checksum = sha3 ("onion checksum" | pubkey || version)[:2],

With that in mind, I could tell my node that it has the IP address of another existing flash node, or even any IP address. It is clear that no one can connect with me because I do not control the IP address. However, I wonder how the implementations would handle such behavior.

Even if implementations do not struggle with such spoofing issues, an attacker could probably use it for fishing to trick a user into paying for a bill because it comes from a node_id that is associated with an IP address of a known service in which the attacked person may even be a customer

Is there anything else that could go wrong with such a spoofing behavior? Maybe it would even have advantages?