Certificates – who / what manages the CRL for a web server?

Let me make sure I understand your question. If your web server has a certificate from a publicly trusted certification authority and the certificate is revoked and placed in a CRL, would you like to know who manages this CRL?

The answer is that the CA does. The management of the revocation information of the certificates they issue is a core function of a certification body. When you pay for a certificate, it is one of the services that you pay for. The updating and publishing of CRLs is largely automatic. However, there may be a user in the loop who may or may not mark your certificate as revoked. depending on how the certificate is revoked. For example, if you call an API to request the revocation of your own certificate, there is almost certainly no one involved. If there is a message from ars technica that you have terribly incorrectly managed the private key of your certificate, it is almost certain that a member of the certification authority will revoke your certificate for you.

Certificates – Does it make sense to use the "Key Encryption" key when using ECDH P384?

I configured a Windows certification authority and created a certificate template for issuing certificates with ECDH_P384 keys:

1

Then I noticed that it is not possible to use the Key Encryption key on the Extensions tab:

2]

What is the reason for this limitation?
Is it correct to say that the use of the key "key encryption" makes no sense when using ECDH since it is already a key agreement protocol?

Public key infrastructure – why create a dedicated issuer CA for TSU certificates?

I have observed the practice of creating dedicated issuer CAs for signing TSU (Time Stamping Unit) certificates instead of just using another existing issuer CA, for example for signing S / MIME certificates or SSL certificates is used.

Here are some examples of the certification paths I found in the area:

- CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
  - CN=DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID Timestamping CA,OU=www.digicert.com,O=DigiCert Inc,C=US
    - CN=TIMESTAMP-SHA256-2019-10-15,O=DigiCert, Inc.,C=US

- CN=Chambers of Commerce Root,OU=http://www.chambersign.org,O=AC Camerfirma SA CIF A82743287,C=EU
  - CN=AC Camerfirma TSA CA,O=AC Camerfirma SA,serialNumber=A82743287,L=Madrid (see current address at www.camerfirma.com/address),emailAddress=ac_camerfirma_tsa_ca@camerfirma.com,C=ES
    - CN=Certificado TSU GSD,O=GSD SAC,L=Lima,emailAddress=consultastsa@gmd-gsd.com.pe,C=PE

- CN=Global Chambersign Root - 2008,O=AC Camerfirma S.A.,serialNumber=A82743287,L=Madrid (see current address at www.camerfirma.com/address),C=EU
  - CN=AC Camerfirma Portugal - 2015,L=Madrid (see current address at www.camerfirma.com/address),serialNumber=A82743287,O=AC Camerfirma S.A.,C=ES
    - CN=DigitalSign Primary CA,L=Guimaraes (see current address at www.digitalsign.pt),serialNumber=PT507015851,O=DigitalSign Certificadora Digital,C=PT
      - CN=DigitalSign TSA CA,O=DigitalSign Certificadora Digital,L=Guimaraes (see current address at www.digitalsign.pt),C=PT,serialNumber=PT507015851
        - CN=SigningHub Timestamping Service,OU=SigningHub Cloud Service,O=Ascertia Ltd,C=GB

Where, in all of these cases, you can find that the name of the issuing certification authority indicates that it is intended for signing TSU certificates.

Now I see a valid point for this practice in https://security.stackexchange.com/a/109134/10247, where it says:

You can differentiate by using different intermediate certification bodies
Issuer's end entity certificates. It makes it possible
Create trust rules that restrict the use of certificates based on the rules
Exhibitors.

But it doesn't seem to me to be justified in this case.

So do you have another reason that could justify creating a dedicated issuer CA just for signing TSU certificates?

Export IOS certificates and configuration profiles

Is there any way to export a configuration profile from an iOS device on which you are logged in as root? So I have a device with an MDM profile with credentials for a WiFi network, VPN, and email authentication certificates. Is there a way to export these certificates and access the 802.1x WiFi password? If I can't export these certificates individually, is there any way to export the entire MDM configuration profile? Any advice would be appreciated. I don't even know where the configuration profiles are stored on the IOS.

Certificates – key usage attributes and advanced key usage attributes that are overridden with CA template properties

I generated a CSR with key usage attributes and extended key usage attributes. However, when we sign with the computer template in Microsoft CA, the attributes in the CSR are overwritten. How do I maintain the attributes in CSR while signing through Microsoft CA?

tls – Can I chain multiple x509 certificates?

I have a very large cluster with over 100 nodes, there are different types, but I will use the Elasticsearch nodes as an example. I encrypt mesh connections between nodes with TLS. This worked fine for the smaller clusters, but the following problem occurred when generating a certificate for the larger cluster:

https://support.venafi.com/hc/en-us/articles/215914307-Error-MS-CA-error-0xc80005e2-while-enrolling

https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/3306.pki-faq-was-ist-die-maximale-Anzahl-von-Namen-, which can be included in the san-extension.aspx

In essence, the maximum size of the SAN list is 4096 bytes with 2 / name for encoding, and my SAN list already has 4566 bytes without the encoding effort.

If I split the SAN list into two certificates (signed by the same certificate authority), can I somehow combine the two certificates into one file that can be used for applications that require a single certificate file? It's as simple as cat cert{1,2}.crt > combined.crt?

Certificates – Breakdown of signature verification in CertificateVerify (TLS 1.3) with RSA-PSS

I'm debugging a TLS v1.3 client program where the signature on the server could never be verified CertificateVerifyI'm learning the procedures for verifying a signature in CertificateVerify Handshake message sent from the server,

Here is my understanding after reading RFC8446 and related articles. Is something wrong or do I have a misunderstanding?

  • The signature scheme must be supported rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, RSASSA-PSS algorithm must be used in CertificateVerify

  • How to generate an RSA signature in CertificateVerify A "digital signature" must be generated on the server side, ie a chain of (1) octet 0x20 Repeated 64 times in a row, (2) the context string TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify. (3) A single byte 0x00 as a delimiter (4) the hashing of hankshake messages to the server Certificate, in other words :

Transcript-Hash(ClientHello || ServerHello || EncryptedExtension || server Certificate)

(Assume the server is not sending CertificateRequest)

  • Accept rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 is used, then the "digital signature" described above with SHA-256 is hashed.

  • Code the hash output of the "digital signature" with (1) a PKCS # 1 PSS algorithm, (2) Salt length (corresponds to the hash output of rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 based on the assumption above)

  • Encrypt the above PSS encoded value with (1) RSA encryption algorithm (2) Private RSA key that corresponds to the previously sent certificate Certificate Handshake message.

  • The encrypted (signed) value given above is the signature of the server's handshake message CertificateVerify,

This is how the client checks the signature of the server CertificateVerify, Is something wrong or am I misunderstood?

  1. Generate "digital signature", the hash output of handshake messages, as described above Transcript-Hash(ClientHello .... server Certificate) if it is also the same as described above, the "digital signature" is hashed according to the signature scheme chosen (provided it is rsa_pss_rsae_sha256).

  2. Decrypt the signature in the CertificateVerify Use (1) RSA public key extracted from the server certificate in the previous handshake message Certificate, (2) RSA encryption algorithm.

  3. Check the decrypted value in the above step with the hashed output of "digital signature" in the first step (1) PKCS # 1 PSS decoding function and (2) adequate salt length (e.g. starting size of SHA-256)

Thank you for reading, every suggestion / tip is appreciated.

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