combinatorics – A coin is tossed 5 times and each flip is either heads or tails. How many possible outcomes contain more heads than tails?

The question is: A coin is tossed 5 times and each flip is either heads or tails. How many possible outcomes contain more heads than tails?

So my reasoning is that it can be:

5 heads = c(5,5) = 5!/5!(5-5)! = 5!/5! = 1

4 heads = c(5,4) = 5!/4!(5-4)! = 5!/4!1! = 5!/4! = 5

3 heads = c(5,3) = 5!/3!(5-3)! = 5!/3!2! = 5*4/2! = 10

so in total 16 possible outcomes. does this seem right?

encryption – Copy private key from OpenKeyChain to tails GPG?

I have a private PGP key on OpenKeyChain that I’d like to move to tails.

There only seems to be one way to export from OpenKeyChain – choose to make the encrypted backup file? But I can’t get the process to work.

  • I made a backup from Android, “backup.sec.pgp” (Noting the passphrase of hyphenated numbers)
  • Transferred it to tails
  • Ran ‘gpg –decrypt backup.sec.pgp | gpg –import backup.sec.pgp’

It returns:

gpg: unknown armor header: Passphrase-Format: numeric9x4
gpg: unknown armor header: Passphrase-Begin: 96
gpg: AES256 encrypted data
gpg: no valid OpenPGP data found.
gpg: Total number processed: 0

Then I enter in the long hyphenated numerical passphrase and it spits out:

gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
gpg: decryption failed: Bad session key

Advice would be hugely appreciated

tails of equestria – How to play the mother roc teaching respect in The Curse of the Statuettes

I’m playing Tails of Equestria with my kids, and we’re just about to start the second adventure, “The Curse of the Statuettes”.

During the adventure, the party is going to have to face a mother roc, and impress her with respect.

The text from the book says:

If you don’t think the PCs impress the roc, she will start to treat them like her babies – trying to teach them manners and good behavior, keeping them in the nest until she’s satisfied.

I fully anticipate my kids not quite grasping that they have to demonstrate respect, so I want to be prepared for this eventuality. However, I have no idea how to play this.

I appreciate that I might be teetering on the edge of this being an open ended question, but can anyone give me specific suggestions about what the roc might actually do to try and teach manners to the group?

Bare in mind that the roc cannot speak pony language although she can understand it.

coldstorage – Question: Docker alternative to Tails OS for generating Bitcoin addresses securely for cold storage

I am exploring options to generate Bitcoin private keys and addresses in most secure ways, using Ian Coleman’s BIP39 tool.

The most recommended OS seems to be Tails OS for using this tool in completely offline mode.

If I used any other minimal linux image in docker, such that it never connects to internet , wouldn’t that be equally safe ? We can also ensure to destroy the container and image from local storage after the address generation.

Do I really need Tails OS for this specific use case ?

privacy – What settings required to privately run bitcoin core on tails?

I am running bitcoin-core on TailsOS which seems to work out of the box. I think TailsOS blocks all unsafe requests but I would like to know what settings I should enable to run it really privately. So far I start my node via

$ ./bitcoin-qt onlynet=onion

Is anything else required? In this answer I read about a bunch of other settings but feel that isn’t required on tails, correct?

App Windows – Tails 4.13 (x64) Multilingual | NulledTeam UnderGround

File Size : 1.1 GB

Tails is a live system that aims to preserve your privacy and anonymity.​

It helps you to use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship almost anywhere you go and on any computer but leaving no trace unless you ask it to explicitly.
It is a complete operating system designed to be used from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card independently of the computer’s original operating system. It is Free Software and based on Debian GNU/Linux.

Tails comes with several built-in applications pre-configured with security in mind: web browser, instant messaging client, email client, office suite, image and sound editor, etc.

Tails is a live operating system, that you can start on almost any computer from a DVD, USB stick, or SD card. It aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity, and helps you to:

use the Internet anonymously and circumvent censorship;

all connections to the Internet are forced to go through the Tor network;

leave no trace on the computer you are using unless you ask it explicitly;

use state-of-the-art cryptographic tools to encrypt your files, emails and instant messaging.



man in the middle – How does a person under surveillance safely download tor or tails in a hostile environment?

One of tor’s stated goals is to help individuals such as journalists, activists and whistleblowers protect against surveillance, and in many countries people in those lines of work or activities are usually subject to surveillance, especially targeted surveillance.

Given a scenario in which a journalist working in an environment where he is subject to active targeted surveillance, how would he safely download tor? Assume that the journalist in question is using a new computer with a freshly installed Linux distribution. In what ways could an adversary with man-in-the-middle capabilities affect or compromise the download?

Does using https to download TAILS or the distribution package manager to download tor provide enough security to protect from malicious third-parties?
How can someone in this scenario safely download tor or TAILS?

anonymity – TAILS anonymous filesharing

I performed some research on filesharing and anonimity, but it turns out anything I read is not about what I need.

Most articles and forums recommend not to use services like Google Drive or Dropbox, as they don’t run on opensource code so you really need to trust the software to be sure your data is safe. Fair enough, but that is not what I need.

I don’t care if the data is safe or not, I just need seamless file sharing, that anybody in the “normal web” can use without having to install complicated software, without ever having to do with command lines etc. I want them to use something mainstream and uncomplicated.

I’d connect to the filesharing website via TAILS, and I don’t want any of my data (eg IP, DNS, ISP, MAC, approximate location… you name it) to be compromised by this setup.

Of course I’ll need to pay much attention to the metadata, to avoid giving away information. But what I’m concerned about is the possibility for the filesharing platform to trace me down through their fancy java functionalities or other tool that may compromise anonimity even if I use TAILS.

Today for example I was testing Dropbox.

To my big surprise they do allow TAILS users with some very limited captcha checks and double factor email authentication.

The point is, I have no chance to see their log and check where do they think I am from. That’s why I’m here asking the experts.

So, to cut a long story short: what would be your best advice to share files and folders with non-anonymous users while staying anonymous, and having them performing all the routine activities they usually perform with filesharing?

After Dropbox, here’s my checklist (I haven’t visited any of them yet):

  • Seafile
  • Spideoak
  • Tresorit

anonymity – VNC to Tails from Tails

Hello would this approach would be appropiate?

Considering using lightvnc-server lightvnc-client to perform this.

Also lets consider that both tails are virtualboxes, I would server and client each one.

Is this approach correct or totally wrong?

What about virtualizing tails and install vbox inside tails and run vbox-tails inside virtualized tails